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ON LAWFUL GOVERNMENTS 
JOSEPH RAZ 
What is the meaning of sentences of 
the form 'X is the lawful government of 
the country Y,' and what kinds of state- 
ments are normally -made by using 
them? Most answers to these questions 
can be classified as legalistic, moralistic, 
or compromise solutions. The gist of the 
legalistic approach is that the lawful 
government is that authorized by the 
positive law of the land. Critics of the 
legalistic approach point out that dis- 
agreement about the lawful government 
is not always solved when agreement is 
reached about the positive law of the 
land. For example, two people may dis- 
agree as to whether the Colonels' Gov- 
ernment is the lawful government of 
Greece, while being in complete agree- 
ment that the post-coup law is the posi- 
tive law of Greece. From this fact, which 
indeed should be admitted and explained 
by any theory on the subject, the moral- 
ists conclude that the lawfulness of a 
government is a matter of morality and 
not of law. It is determined by moral 
rules, by personal commitments, etc. 
Those who favor a compromise solution 
claim that in certain contexts sentences 
about lawful governments are used to 
make legal statements, while in other 
contexts they are used to make moral 
statements or express moral positions or 
attitudes. 
In this paper I will first criticize one 
moralistic solution, that presented by 
R. M. Hare, and one compromise solu- 
tion, the one put forward by J. G. 
Murphy, and then proceed to formulate 
and defend a variant of a legalistic 
position. 
Professor Hare' accuses previous 
writers on the topic of committing the 
sin of descriptivism. All of them as- 
sumed that "to explain the meaning of 
any predicate is to give the criteria or 
conditions which have to be satisfied by 
a subject before this predicate is cor- 
rectly predicated of it" (p. 158). He 
divides his predecessors into two camps, 
those who favor non-empirical criteria 
of lawfulness (e.g., natural law theories, 
hereditary theories) and those who de- 
fend empirical criteria (e.g., might-is- 
right theories, popular sovereignty theo- 
ries). 
Non-empirical criteria are rejected 
because they are too indeterminate and 
slippery to be of any value in settling 
concrete disputes about the lawfulness 
of certain governments. Empirical cri- 
teria are rejected because they entail a 
statement of the form 'The lawful gov- 
ernment is the government F' (where F 
is an empirical predicate), which is an 
analytic statement. For example, some 
statement like 'The lawful government 
is the effective government or the gov- 
ernment which enjoys popular support' 
is analytic according to these theories. 
According to Hare, however, no state- 
ment of the form 'X is the lawful gov- 
ernment but is not F' is a contradiction, 
although some such statements are, per- 
haps, false. 
Hare proceeds (pp. 163-64) to exam- 
ine an ascriptive theory which he im- 
putes to H. L. A. Hart.2 According to 
this theory, legal sentences are often 
used to make "inverted commas" state- 
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ments about what the courts will decide. 
In general, according to Hare, a sen- 
tence is used in "inverted commas" if it 
is used to make a statement which is 
true if and only if the same sentence is 
actually used, or will be used, nonde- 
scriptively by some determinate person 
or group. Legal sentences, he claims, are 
used by solicitors in inverted commas to 
predict what the courts will decide. The 
primary use of such sentences, however, 
is by the courts in ascribing responsibil- 
ity, rights, etc. By using such sentences, 
the courts do not describe or predict any 
situation; they create a new state of 
affairs. This use of sentences by the 
courts is called by Hare "ascriptive." 
When applying this theory to the 
problem of lawful governments, it may 
seem that the courts in their decisions 
ascribe lawfulness to the government. 
Other people use sentences of the type 
'X is the lawful government' to predict 
that the competent court will decide 
that X is the lawful government. Even 
though this theory is not guilty of the 
sin of descriptivism, Hare finds it un- 
satisfactory for it merely transfers the 
problem from the lawfulness of the 
government to the lawfulness of the 
court. To claim that a lawful court is a 
court which a lawful court will decide to 
be lawful does not clarify the issue and 
explains nothing (pp. 164-65). 
Hare's own solution is a modified 
ascriptive theory. He suggests that, not 
only courts, but also ordinary people, 
can and do use such sentences ascrip- 
tively. The primary use of sentences 
about lawfulness is to declare allegiance 
to the government, not to make any 
statements. They have, however, also 
a secondary, "inverted commas," use. 
They can be used to make statements 
about the allegiance of the population 
(p. 166). The effect of a pledge of alle- 
giance is to preclude the possibility of a 
certain kind of criticism of the govern- 
ment (p. 168). There is a second type 
of primary use, which is also ascriptive 
but has special features. This is recogni- 
tion of a government according to inter- 
national law (p. 166). The conse- 
quences of such acts of recognition are 
determined by international law and 
-the laws of the recognizing countries. 
By this theory Hare wishes to pre- 
serve the valid insight embodied in 
theories of popular sovereignty while 
avoiding the pitfall of descriptivism (p. 
167). This aim is presumably achieved 
by interpreting the inverted commas 
use of 'the relevant sentences according 
to popular sovereignty theories but, 
nevertheless, maintaining that by ex- 
pressing a sentence of the type 'X is the 
lawful government but does not enjoy 
popular support' one is not contradict- 
ing oneself, for the first part of the sen- 
tence is not used to make a statement. 
It is a declaration of personal allegiance 
to a government which does not enjoy 
popular support. 
II 
For various reasons Hare's theory 
fails to account for the ways sentences 
concerning lawfulness are used. Ascrip- 
tive theories raise serious problems, and 
their applicability is much more limited 
than their first proponents once thought. 
This is not the place to deal with the 
general issues raised by ascriptivism 
and cognate theories.3 I will restrict my 
comments 'to a few points raised by 
the application of the ascriptive theory 
to the problem of the lawfulness of 
governments. 
1. Once a declaration of allegiance 
is made, the person who made it is 
bound by it until it is cancelled by his' 
acts (e.g., emigration or naturalization 
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in a foreign country, or, perhaps, its 
mere repudiation by him) or by events 
(e.g., the fall *of the government). A 
person who has declared his allegiance 
cannot repeat his declaration as long as 
the first declaration continues to bind 
him. If the effects of making such a 
declaration are that he incurs certain 
obligations and is debarred from mak- 
ing a certain kind of criticism, then by 
repeating the sentence 'X is the lawful 
government' he does not double his 
obligations nor does he further decrease 
his right to criticize the government. 
Therefore, by repeating the sentence 
he does not declare his allegiance for a 
second time. But, obviously a person 
can discuss the lawfulness of a certain 
government every day, repeating the 
sentence 'X is the lawful government' 
many times. How should his utterances, 
except for the first, be interpreted? 
Hare may claim that he is using the 
sentence in inverted commas to assert 
popular support for the government. 
This interpretation is unreasonable in 
many cases where people proceed to 
support claims made by the use of 
these sentences by reference to the posi- 
tive law of the land or to international 
law. For these legal arguments are ir- 
relevant to the extent of popular loyalty 
to the government. The 'inverted com- 
mas' use theory is also impossible if 
the person concerned is one arguing that 
the Bourbon heir is the lawful govern- 
ment of France, while admitting that 
he does not enjoy popular support. 
It may be that this point can be met 
by modifying the theory of the 'inverted 
commas' use to allow for the use of 
sentences of the form 'X is the lawful 
government' for making statements 
about the allegiance of any group of 
people, not only about the allegiance of 
the general population. A supporter of 
the Bourbons as well as his opponent 
arguing for the legality of the present 
government of France will be under- 
stood as making statements about their 
own formerly declared allegiances, 
rather than declaring their allegiance 
over and over again. 
2. Both when people declare alle- 
giance and when they state it, what they 
say can neither be refuted nor substan- 
tiated by reference to any legal or moral 
rules, although such reference may per- 
haps move them to modify their stand. 
No doubt Hare regards this result of 
his theory as one of its attractions. 
Nevertheless, it leaves one unable to 
explain how courts debate and decide 
the lawfulness of governments, elec- 
tions, or appointments by reference to 
the law. The judges cannot reasonably 
be said to be defending or declaring 
their own allegiance on purely legal 
grounds. Should one conclude that there 
is an allegiance of the courts which is 
different from that of the judges, and is 
a sort of institutional allegiance? Is this 
view tenable in view of the facts that 
the courts often are, and regard them- 
selves as being, legally bound to recog- 
nize the lawfulness of governments and 
other institutions? Even if we are ready 
to extend the notion of allegiance that 
much, Hare's theory is not saved, for: 
(a) We have recognized by this exten- 
sion of the notion a purely legal sense of 
"lawful government." Courts are under 
legal obligation to declare the lawful- 
ness of a government, and ordinary 
people assert these legal obligations of 
the courts by the use of sentences con- 
cerning lawfulness. (b) Even so, we 
have difficulties in explaining repeated 
decisions of a court. Should we grant 
that in its first decision it declared its 
official legal allegiance and that in fur- 
ther decisions it states that it owes legal 
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allegiance to that government? Is there 
anything in legal practices which re- 
flects this difference? 
3. Neither can Hare's theory explain 
in what way people are using sentences 
concerned with lawfulness when dis- 
cussing the lawfulness of a foreign 
government. They cannot and do not 
wish to pledge their allegiance to it. 
Consequently, they cannot be said to 
make statements about their own alle- 
giance. If they are not interested in the 
degree to which the government under 
discussion is actually supported by any- 
one, they cannot be said to make any 
kind of inverted commas use of sen- 
tences. 
4. Finally, one can apply Hare's own 
master argument against himself. Sup- 
pose that someone uses a sentence of 
the type 'X is the lawful government 
though I do not owe it allegiance, I am 
not declaring my allegiance to it, and 
it is not supported by the population.' 
Far from being a contradiction or in 
any way paradoxical, such sentences 
can be used to make true statements. 
This presumably would happen if I used 
such a sentence to make a statement 
about the government of East Germany. 
But, according to Hare, if the sentence 
is used in its primary use, it is para- 
doxical; and if used in 'inverted com- 
mas,' the statement made is contradic- 
tory. 
IIY 
J. G. Murphy4 favors what I have 
called a compromise solution. He claims 
that sentences about the lawfulness of 
government are sometimes used to 
make legal statements, and sometimes 
to express moral claims of a special 
kind: ". . . the concept of lawfulness 
or legitimacy is, I submit, a pedigree 
concept. By this I mean that it focuses 
upon the origin of a government, the 
procedure which brought it about and 
not upon the content of the enactments 
of that government. . . . Though law- 
fulness or legitimacy claims are moral, 
then, they are a special kind of moral 
claim. They are claims about pedigree 
rather than content" (p. 67). Legal 
statements about the lawfulness of gov- 
ernments are true if and only if these 
governments are authorized by the legal 
rules.5 It would seem that according 
to Murphy moral claims about lawful- 
ness or legitimacy of governments are 
true or justified if and only if these 
governments have been established in 
accordance with certain moral rules. 
Murphy is mistaken in thinking that 
a standard use of sentences about law- 
fulness is to make statements which can 
be justified or sustained by exclusive 
reference to moral rules. Reference to 
legal rules is always necessary to the 
complete justification of such state- 
ments.6 
A government is not a government 
unless its actions have legal effect. If 
there is no legal system according to 
which the acts of a certain body of per- 
sons have legal consequences different 
from the consequences of similar acts 
of ordinary citizens, then this body is 
not a government. It may be morally 
entitled to be the government of a cer- 
tain country. But moral right does not 
make it into a government. Its claim 
to this title has to be supported also by 
reference to a legal system in which its 
acts are recognized as acts of govern- 
ment. This legal system may be a legal 
system overthrown in a revolution or a 
coup d'etat. It may be the legal system 
of a revolutionary movement which has 
not yet succeeded in establishing its 
control over the country, and perhaps 
never will. But reference to some legal 
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system there must be. For governments 
by their very nature are bodies operat- 
ing by legal means. And lawful govern- 
ments are governments. Any adequate 
account of the concept of a lawful gov- 
ernment has to account for this fact. 
Consequently, only the legalistic ap- 
proach to the problem provides the key 
to its solution. It is within the frame 
set by 'this approach that one will have 
to account for the use of sentences 
about lawfulness to express a moral 
stand. 
IV 
A legalistic explanation of the law- 
fulness of governments has to satisfy 
two conditions: 
1. Statements about lawfulness have 
to be explained as legal statements, that 
is, the fact that certain laws belong to 
certain legal systems must be a neces- 
sary condition of the truth of such 
statements. 
2. The explanation has to include 
two parts: (a) spelling out the con- 
ditions which have to be satisfied if a 
body of persons is to be a lawful govern- 
ment; (b) specifying the legal effects 
of the actions of a body constituting a 
lawful government. 
This second condition explains what 
is wrong with descriptivist explanations. 
Specifying "the criteria or conditions 
which have to be satisfied by a sub- 
ject before a predicate is correctly ap- 
plied to it" is indeed not a complete ex- 
planation of legal or moral or any other 
normative predicate. This is not because 
these criteria are not relevant to the 
explanation. They form 'only a part of 
it, though an essential part. To under- 
stand- what 'good' or 'a right' or 'a duty,' 
etc., mean one has to know not only 
the criteria for their application but 
also what their application entails. One 
has to know what is entailed by state- 
ments like "John has a right to leave 
the country," "This is a good car," "His 
was a virtuous action." 
When the explanation of legal terms 
is at issue, the explanation is incomplete 
unless the legal effects of the correct 
application of the terms are explained. 
Knowing that ownership can be ac- 
quired by sale, gift, etc., is part of the 
explanation of ownership. But an essen- 
tial part of the explanation of ownership 
is that the owner is at liberty to use his 
property, has power to dispose of it or 
to grant partial rights in it, and so on, 
all of which are the legal consequences 
of ownership. 
An explanation of the lawfulness of 
governments can be either particular or 
general. It may be correct relative to 
a certain legal system or true of any 
legal system. If it is relative to a par- 
ticular legal system, it will specify the 
conditions and procedures of setting up 
a government according to that system, 
and the powers and rights accorded to 
a government by that system, as well as 
the obligations imposed on it. 
There are no universally accepted 
procedures for establishing govern- 
ments. In this respect the concept of 
government differs from that of owner- 
ship and many other legal concepts. 
There are certain ways of acquiring 
ownership. Not every legal system has 
to recognize all of them, and legal sys- 
tems may differ in their detailed regula- 
tion of sales, gifts, wills, etc. Neverthe- 
less, ways of acquiring and disposing of 
ownership are part of this concept. For 
example, a legal system which does not 
allow for any voluntary and agreed 
transfer of property rights does not 
recognize the institution of ownership. 
It may, of course, have other means for 
regulating property rights. Because 
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there are no universally accepted pro- 
cedures for establishing governments, 
the general characterization of the con- 
cept of a lawful government will state 
only that a body is a government ac- 
cording to a given legal system if ac- 
cording to that system it is recognized 
as possessing certain powers and rights 
and is subject to certain duties. The 
brunt of a general characterization of 
a lawful government will rest in the 
specification of the rights, powers, and 
duties which a body must have, accord- 
ing to some legal system, if it is to be 
a government according to that legal 
system. 
The important point to notice is that 
every particular characterization is rel- 
ative to a particular legal system and 
that the general characterization also 
defines what it is to be a government 
according to a specific legal system. 
Statements of the form 'X is the lawful 
government of Y' refer implicitly to 
a given legal system. Usually the refer- 
ence is clear from the context in which 
the statement is made, although occa- 
sionally misunderstandings may arise. 
One may assert that a government is 
lawful according to legal systems which 
are, at the time of assertion, the positive 
law of a certain country or a certain 
population. But the lawfulness of a 
government may also be judged accord- 
ing to a system which is no longer in 
force or which has not yet established 
itself. The lawfulness of a government 
may be judged relative to the Roman 
legal system or the legal system of 
France in the time of Louis XV, etc. 
In such cases, very often the only cor- 
rect assertion is that there is at present 
no body of persons which is the lawful 
government according to such and such 
a legal system. 
This program for an explanation of 
the concept of a legal system is fairly 
simple. The difficulties arise not in the 
explanation of the concept itself but 
from the fact that it is used in a great 
variety of contexts. A few words have 
to be said about some of these contexts, 
and the rest of this article is a brief 
discussion of three important types of 
contexts in which the concept is used. 
They may be termed the 'legal', the 
'jurisprudential', and the 'moral' con- 
text. These names indicate the kinds of 
issues at stake in each context. They 
do not imply that the truth-conditions 
of statements about lawfulness vary 
with the context, only that the point of 
making the statements differs. 
Before turning to the examination of 
the three contexts, one final remark 
should be made about the concept of 
lawfulness itself. What is the difference 
between a government and a lawful 
government? It is analogous to the dif- 
ference between a law and a valid law. 
Just as any law, if it is a law, is valid, 
so any government, if it is a govern- 
ment, is lawful. It is, however, expedi- 
ent to be able to discuss the validity of 
a law, or the lawfulness of a government 
and to be able to distinguish clearly, 
by the use of words like 'validity' and 
'lawfulness' between such discussions 
and discussions of the content or merit 
of a law or the composition or acts of a 
government. To say of a government 
that it is lawful is to state an opinion 
on the question of its lawfulness. To 
state that the lawful government did 
so and so or is composed of X and Y, or 
has proved itself, etc., is, inter alia, to 
intimate emphatically an opinion on the 
question of its lawfulness. There are, 
of course, other devices serving similar 
purposes. One may ask whether the 
putative government is the govern- 
ment; or whether what is apparently the 
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government is really the government, 
and so forth. 
V 
A. THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
When controversies about the law- 
fulness of governments and other insti- 
tutions do not involve disputes as to 
which is the relevant legal system, the 
controversy is a legal one. Problems of 
this nature are very common. Disputes 
may arise about the legality of an ap- 
pointment or an election. Their legality 
may be objected to because one or more 
of the conditions laid down by law were 
not observed. Claims that the elections 
were rigged, or the appointment biased 
or secured by improper means, may be 
made. Disagreement may also arise 
about the interpretation of the election 
law or other relevant laws. Even the 
validity of the election law or some 
other relevant law may be doubted. 
In all these cases there are commonly 
accepted rules, canons of interpretation, 
and, ultimately, courts bound to use 
these rules, by recourse to which such 
disputes can be settled. This does not 
mean that there always is one correct 
solution to such controversies. The rele- 
vant law may be ambiguous or vague. 
But such cases are common to, all 
branches of the law and are not peculiar 
to problems of lawfulness. Lawyers and 
courts have ways of dealing with them. 
Ultimately they are solved by the courts 
using their discretion, which is guided 
by general legal policies and principles. 
Most legal systems contain rules lay- 
ing down conditions of recognition of 
foreign governments and the effects of 
such recognition. According to such 
rules, it is possible to judge which body 
is recognized by the Israeli law or by 
international law as the French govern- 
ment. Such rules dictate (a) which legal 
system should be taken account of, 
which legal system should be recog- 
nized; (b) which body should be rec- 
ognized by the system as the govern- 
ment according to a certain foreign legal 
system. For example, the question may 
arise whether, according to Israeli law, 
Ian Smith's government (or putative 
government) is a legal government (or 
a government). Its solution depends on 
Israeli rules determining (a) whether 
the post-UDI or the pre-UDI Rhode- 
sian legal system should be recognized; 
(b) is Smith's government the govern- 
ment to be recognized by Israeli law as 
lawful under the recognized legal sys- 
tem? 
Nowadays it is the universal practice 
of legal systems to recognize only one 
legal system in force in any territory. 
This is a fundamental policy, but it is 
not logically necessary. Two legal sys- 
tems can be recognized by a third as 
applying to the same territory but to 
different groups of persons or in differ- 
ent matters (religious vs. other mat- 
ters), etc. 
B. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT 
Occasionally a person is interested 
in knowing which is the lawful govern- 
ment in a certain country pure and 
simple. He is not satisfied when told 
that it depends on which legal system 
he takes as his criterion. He insists that 
there surely must be one and only one 
government in every country, and he 
wants to know which it is. His interest 
in the question may be factual or moral. 
He may be simply interested in learning 
the legal situation in that country, or 
he may be interested in deciding which 
government he is morally bound to re- 
spect and obey. Let us examine the 
matter-of-fact question first. 
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The question is misconceived if one 
assumes that of necessity there is only 
one lawful government in a country and 
that the question can be answered in 
an absolute way which is not relative to 
a certain legal system. Nevertheless, the 
kind of information the inquirer is after 
is usually clear and, if not, can be 
ascertained by questioning him. If his 
interest is factual, it will usually be 
discovered that he wished to learn which 
body is the government according to the 
positive law of the land. Usually there 
will be no difficulty in providing him 
with the required information. But oc- 
casionally there may be some doubt as 
to the right answer. If there is no doubt 
which legal system is the positive law 
of that country, any problems there are 
are typical legal-context problems. But 
sometimes the problem is which legal 
system is the positive law of that coun- 
try. When such problems arise within 
a legal context, that is, when the prob- 
lem is which legal system is recognized 
as the law of country A according to the 
law of country B, then it is settled ac- 
cording to the rules of the legal system 
of B. But if one is not interested in the 
judgment of one legal system on an- 
other, then the problem is a jurispruden- 
tial one. It is to be settled by applying 
the jurisprudential criterion of exis- 
tence, which lays down necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of 
legal systems. This is not the place to 
discuss what is the correct criterion of 
existence. But it is worth pointing out 
that it must allow for undetermined 
situations. It must recognize that some- 
times the situation is unsettled; so that 
even though all the relevant informa- 
tion is known, no legal system can be 
said to be the legal system of the coun- 
try. 
C. THE MORAL CONTEXT 
When, by asking which is the lawful 
government, the question meant is 
which government is entitled to our 
allegiance, it can be sensibly raised in 
this way only if two governments, each 
lawful according to a different legal sys- 
tem, compete for our allegiance. It is 
overtly a legal question, but obliquely 
it raises a moral issue. It can be refor- 
mulated as a question of which legal sys- 
tem one should accept or promote, etc. 
The question is to be decided by apply- 
ing moral rules and criteria. This does 
not mean that no legal rules are relevant 
to the truth of the answer. It means 
merely that the legal situation is not 
in dispute.8 When two people disagree 
in this sense about whether or not 
Smith's government is the lawful gov- 
ernment of Rhodesia, their dispute 
really turns on which legal system one 
should support. The only way to pro- 
mote the discussion is to agree that 
Smith's government is lawful according 
to the post-UDI legal system, while un- 
lawful according to the pre-UDI legal 
system. That settles the legal dispute 
and with it the dispute about which is 
the lawful government. The discussion 
should then proceed to examine the 
merits of the competing legal systems 
and their claims to the allegiance of 
the people of Rhodesia or of the dis- 
putants. 
It may be claimed that, in admitting 
that moral disputes are occasionally ex- 
pressed as disputes about the lawfulness 
of governments, and asserting that when 
expressed in this way they are miscast, 
I have admitted in fact that the legalis- 
tic approach fails to account for the 
ordinary meaning of the expression 'a 
lawful government.' Even if true this 
objection is not fatal. Conceptual anal- 
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ysis aims at the clarification and sys- 
tematization of concepts and is not 
bound to reflect usage where that usage 
is confused and liable to mislead. Any- 
one who has witnessed discussions of 
the lawfulness of governments in com- 
plicated cases knows how moral, juris- 
prudential, and legal considerations 
tend to be inexorably entangled, and 
consequently the discussion is bogged 
down in confusions. If the analysis of- 
fered above does anything to disen- 
tangle the various strands of the prob- 
lem, it has served its purpose. 
The legalistic approach is, however, 
quite successful in explaining ordinary 
usage. It has not been suggested that 
it is wrong to raise moral issues by as- 
serting or denying the lawfulness of 
governments. It has only been suggested 
that this is an oblique way of raising 
such issues and that confusion results 
if this fact is overlooked. The possibility 
of making or intimating judgments in 
this way is not, and should not be, ex- 
plained by the meaning of the expres- 
sion 'a lawful government' but by prag- 
matical conventions governing the use 
of this as well as any other legal expres- 
sion.9 In many contexts making a legal 
statement pragmatically implies an ac- 
ceptance of the legal system presup- 
posed by the statement. When stating 
'One ought to pay one's taxes punctu- 
ally,' or 'One ought to notify the police 
of a planned demonstration,' or 'One 
can get married by taking such and 
such steps,' etc., the speaker will usually 
be taken to accept the legal system ac- 
cording to which these statements are 
alleged to be true. Surely, in some con- 
texts the presumption does not apply. 
It does not apply or is greatly modified 
when one is discussing foreign law. It 
is, at least, very much weakened when 
the speaker is a lawyer pursuing his 
profession. In all contexts there are 
verbal devices for avoiding the pre- 
sumption. Often even explicitly men- 
tioning 'that this is the case according 
to this or that legal system is enough to 
prevent the presumption from arising. 
Statements about the lawfulness of 
governments give rise to the same pre- 
sumption. Again the presumption is 
particularly strong when the speakers 
are not talking while pursuing profes- 
sional legal activities, when they are 
referring to their own government, and 
when they do not refer explicitly to 
the presupposed legal system but are 
talking about 'the' legal government. 
This pragmatic convention explains 
most cases of the 'moralistic' use of 
statements about lawfulness.'0 It clari- 
fies the point 'that this is an oblique way 
of raising moral issues and that every 
fruitful discussion of 'them must soon 
abandon the problem of lawful- 
ness, which is a legal problem, and turn 
on the moral considerations at stake. 
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM 
NOTES 
1. "The Lawful Government," in Philosophy, 
Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W. G. 
Runciman, 3d ed. (New York, 1967), pp. 157-72. 
2. In his article "The Ascription of Responsibil- 
ity and Rights," in Logic and Language, ed. 
A. G. N. Flew, 1st ser. (New York, 1951). Hart 
has since rejected much of what he said in this arti- 
cle. 
3. Cf. Peter Geach's criticism of Hart's article 
mentioned above in- his "Ascriptivism," Philo- 
sophical Review 49 (1960): 221-25, also published 
in R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn (Chicago, 
1967), pp. 224-26. 
4. "Allegiance and Lawful Government," Ethics 
79 (1968): 56-69. 
5. I hesitate to attribute this view to Murphy, 
for his account of the legal use of such sentences 
is somewhat confused. I will not deal with this 
part of his theory. 
6. Murphy is wrong in identifying lawfulness 
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with legitimacy. The latter concept is much less 
closely connected with the law than the former. 
However, as the concept of government is a legal 
concept, even statements about the legitimacy of 
governments have to be substantiated by reference 
to the law, though, perhaps, not to the exclusion 
of morality. 
7. On legal statements, see Hart, "Definition and 
Theory in Jurisprudence," in Aristotelian Society 
Suppl. vol. (1955); H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory 
of Law, 2d ed. (Berkeley, Calif., 1927), sect. 16; 
and my The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford, 
1970). For a criticism of the explanation of legal 
statements as predictions, see Hart, The Concept 
of Law (New York, 1961), pp. 132-44. 
8. Certain legal points may be in dispute insofar 
as they affect the moral decision. 
9. An example of a pragmatical presumption 
is the presumption mentioned above that when re- 
ferring to the lawful government one refers im- 
plicitly to the effective legal system of the country. 
10. It does not explain those relatively few cases 
where no legal system, but rather 'natural law' 
or the laws of God are presupposed. These cases 
are remnants of belief in natural law and should 
be discarded with these beliefs. 
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